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The  present  period  of  financial  instability  is  also  likely  to  become 
known  as  the  end  of  an  era;  an  era  of  economic  calm  and  policy 
consensus on ways to maintain market stability.  After World War II, 
the federal government operated on the Keynesian principles that the 
right  mix  of  spending,  regulation,  and  interest  rates  could  tame 
economic  cycles  and  eliminate  surges  of  unemployment.    In  this 
period,  now  known  as  the  Great  Moderation,  we  assumed  that  we 
knew how to prevent economic crises, such as the recurrence of the 
Great  Depression.    However,  it  is  clear  that  those  principles  were 
erroneous  as  the  economy  has  entered  a  lesser,  but  still  severe 
downturn; the Great Recession.  This paper looks at the sources of the 
ongoing economic crisis and points to the unique role in its origins of 
real estate asset bubbles and mispriced credit, not only in the origin of 
this crisis, but of many financial crises.  An analysis of the data points 
to  the  role  of  mispriced  mortgage  backed  securities  (MBS)  in  the 
spread  of  aggressive  mortgage  products  and  the  unwarranted  price 
speculation that resulted in massive foreclosures.  In turn, the paper 
addresses the source of mispriced risk in MBS as incomplete markets 
in real estate and non-tradability of MBS and related securities, which 
ultimately  led  to  the  collapse  of  financial  system,  threatening  global 
economic health.  The paper also suggests corrective measures that 
can and should be taken to assist the short and long term recovery. Wachter    219 
 
 
1  Introduction 
 
The present period of financial instability is also likely to become known as 
the end of an era; an era of economic calm and policy consensus on ways to 
maintain market stability.  
 
After a period of several decades known by macroeconomists as the Great 
Moderation, a period in which we assumed we knew how to prevent economic 
crises such as a recurrence of the Great Depression, we have experienced in 
the US and in many countries, the worst and longest recession in decades.  I 
will address where we are today, the source of the crisis, and what can be 
done in the short and longer run to assist in the recovery.  
 
 
2  Where We Are Today 
 
In the last quarter of 2007, the US economy entered into the worst downturn 
since the Great Depression. With credit flows seized up, a self-reinforcing 
adverse cycle developed. The eroding financial system upended the economy, 
putting  further  pressure  on  the  financial  system.  This  crisis  differs  from 
previous postwar recessions in the US not only in its severity, but also in the 
collapse of the financial system itself. In response to this crisis, the Federal 
Reserve  System  (Fed)  and  the  Treasury  vastly  expanded  their  roles.  In 
addition, an unprecedentedly large fiscal stimulus package was implemented. 
However, more is needed for private credit flows to resume; confidence in the 
financial  system  must  be  restored.  Restoring  confidence  requires  an 
understanding of what went wrong as well as an effective response to reverse 
the decline. 
 
Going forward, the economic outlook remains bleak for now. Although the 
spread between the three-month London interbank offered rate (LIBOR) and 
three-month T-bill rates, as shown in Figure 1, has recovered, credit markets 
remain badly shaken, with no private-label MBS issuance and little issuance 
of emerging market and private corporate debt. As Figure 1 also indicates, 
commodity  and  stock  markets  have  been  roiled,  with  US  stock  prices  off 
about 30% to 40% from their peak in 2007. In the US, real GDP fell in Q4 of 
2007, and again in Q3 and Q4 of 2008, and Q1 of 2009, at an annual rate of 
more  than  6%,  although  as  of  Q2,  this  decline  has  moderated  to  1%. 
Additionally, the economy  has shed over seven  million jobs so far on net 
(through July 2009), raising the unemployment rate by 4.6 percentage points 
to 9.5%. 
 
Reduced  availability  of  credit  and  declining  wealth  have  been  the  driving 
factors  in  the  economic  deterioration.  Net  worth  has  fallen  by  about  $15 
trillion, more than $6 trillion from a 30% decline in house prices, as shown in 220    Ongoing Financial Upheaval 
 
 
Figure 2, and $8 trillion from the almost 50% decline in stock prices since 
their relative peaks.  
 
Monetary and fiscal responses are also unprecedented. Monetary initiatives 
include a near zero federal funds target rate. The Fed has ramped up lending 
through credit facilities. Financial institutions can use securities as collateral 
to borrow from the Fed. Additionally, the Fed can now purchase almost all 
securities that it deems necessary. As a result of the Fed’s actions, LIBOR and 
commercial  paper  rates  have  fallen  and  the  volume  of  new  issuance  of 
commercial paper has sharply increased, and Fannie/Freddie mortgage rates 
have  fallen  to  approximately  5%.  As  of  February  2009,  Fannie/Freddie 
mortgage rates are near their lowest level in decades, but bank lending and 
private issuance of mortgage credit is limited to nearly nonexistent. 
 
The goal of fiscal stimulus measures is to maximize the near-term boost to 
return to economic growth within two years. It has been estimated (Zandi, 
2009) that without fiscal stimulus, real GDP would decline for seven quarters, 
falling by 2.5% in 2009, and unemployment would exceed 10% with nearly 
five million jobs lost by mid-2010. Thus, it is hoped that the nearly $1 trillion 
fiscal stimulus plan in 2009 will curtail real GDP and job losses. Even so, the 
stimulus would allow the economy to reach full employment only by the end 
of 2012.  
 
 
Nonetheless, the nature of the crisis is such that these responses cannot return 




3  Understanding  the  Sources  of  the  Ongoing  Financial 
Upheaval 
 
While  these  steps  are  necessary  for  recovery,  they  are  not  sufficient.  The 
monetary authorities in the US have gone beyond traditional monetary policy 
to  quantitative  easing,  since  in  the  absence  of  continued  direct  funding  to 
credit markets by the Fed, the Keynesian limits of pushing on a string have 
proven  to  be  correct.  Fiscal  policy  also  has  its  limits  due  to  long-term 
indebtedness  concerns.  The  previous  consensus  on  the  difficulty  of  timing 
such  stimulus  so  that  it  actually  helps  stem  economic  decline  has  been 
overcome both by the severity of the current event and the likelihood that the 
decline will be prolonged. 



















Figure 1  Financial Series 
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Figure 2  Case-Shiller 
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Thus, fiscal and monetary stimulus will not suffice. The lesson from Japan is 
that for growth to reoccur, financial markets must function again. The balance 
sheets of banks have to be restructured, forcing the writing off of bad loans. 
The  housing  market  needs  to  be  dealt  with  so  that  nonperforming  and 
underwater mortgages do not fuel an overshooting price decline, given the 
impediments to optimal workouts that currently exist in securitized pools.  
 
Moreover, there needs to be confidence again that financial institutions are 
safe  for  investment  and  that  there  will  be  demand  for  their  growth.  Re-
instilling confidence will require far greater certainty than that which exists 
today,  in  that  the  financial  system  will  not  expose  investors  to  risks  of 
unknown dimensions. For this, we will need to improve our understanding of 
the  source  of  the  current  crisis  and  therefore,  of  the  appropriate  steps  to 
prevent a recurrence.  
 
While  monetary  policy  reforms  in  many  countries  have  helped  to  bring 
inflation under control, in past decades, asset price bubbles have worsened 
over time. With today’s extreme debacle, there is only one in a series, which 
includes the Savings and Loan crisis in the US, the Asian Financial Crisis, and 
the earlier lost decade in Japan.
3 Thus, we must improve our understanding of 
the source of this macro-instability.  
 
Each of these episodes is preceded by an unsustainable build-up of debt. Also, 
in this crisis, household and financial debts as shares of GDP are pushed to 
unprecedented  heights,  as  shown  in  Figure  3.  Mortgage  debt  in  particular 
increases along with the seemingly rising value of the underlying collateral, 
the  housing  asset.
4 However,  the  question  that  is  not  addressed  by  this 
description of the crisis is why and how did leverage rise to unsustainable 
heights?  At  the  time  that  these  chronic  imbalances  were  developing,  the 
response was that asset prices correctly reflected low interest rates and thus 
debt-to-asset ratios were not out of balance. If assets were correctly priced, it 
was argued, high debt-to-income ratios would not produce a crisis since loans 
would be repayable through refinancing or sale of the property, if necessary. 
 
                                                            
3 See Allen and Gale (2000), which documents previous episodes (in particular, Nordic 
countries and Japan in the late 1980s to early 1990s) in which rapid expansion of credit 
and asset price boom-and-bust cycles are intertwined. 
4 For a discussion of the links between housing wealth and economic activity, see 
Mishkin (2007). Also, for a general discussion on the development of the literature of 
macroeconomics  and  housing,  see  the  review  by  Leung  (2004)  and  the  references 
therein. Mishkin links current and past financial crises to periods of rapid financial 
change, and to lending booms which “outstrip the available information resources in 
the financial system”. Pavlov and Wachter (2009) points to the role of the procyclical 
decline in lending standards and the resulting rise in housing prices, which indeed, is in 







































Figure 3  Chronic Imbalances 
 




However,  the  problem  was  not  simply  low  interest  rate  debt,  rather,  the 
problem was underpriced debt. As Pavlov and Wachter (2008) shows, inflated 
asset prices are the inevitable outcome of underpriced credit risk. If the default 
option  in  mortgage  loans  is  underpriced,  the  inevitable  outcome  is  an 
unsustainable rise in asset prices. When asset prices deflate, credit seizes up, 
and the high debt-to-income ratios become the immediate source of defaults. 
However, it is the asset price inflation and then deflation, and the mispriced 
credit that is responsible for defaults and the ever-widening crisis. Households, 
in the aftermath of the bubble, are then exposed both to a higher cost of credit 
and loans that they cannot repay due to the collapse in collateral values. The 
current crisis derives from a credit bubble which led to an asset bubble; in the 
absence of the credit bubble, the asset bubble would not have occurred. The 
credit and asset bubbles together are responsible for the severity of the global 
financial turmoil.  
 
Although  the  crisis  was  preceded  by  a  worldwide  credit  bubble,  the  US 
housing mortgage and housing markets are arguably at the center of the crisis. 
Abraham et al. provides evidence that the volatility adjusted run-up in US 
housing  prices,  particularly  after  2003,  exceeds  price  increases  among  US 
trading partners and that so far, the downturn in US housing prices has been 
the most severe (Figure 4, see Abraham, Pavlov and Wachter, 2008). The US 
run-up in housing prices was itself induced by a credit bubble of historically 
unprecedented  dimensions.  The  introduction  of  subprime  and  other 
nontraditional mortgage (NTM) loans rapidly expanded after 2003, at terms 
that  could  not  be  repaid  (Table  1).  These  aggressive  loans  allowed  credit 
constraints  to  be  overcome,  expanding  the  demand  for  homes.  The 
underpricing of the put option embedded in these loans also increased the 
price of the housing asset collateralized by the newly affordable, easy to get, 
and cheap loans. 
 
The  market  share  of  these  loans  grew  from  under  15%  to  almost  half  of 
originations by 2006 (the sum of the market share of HELOCs, Alt-A, and 
subprime, as shown in Table 1). Within these loan types, the consolidated 
loan-to-value ratios (CLTVs) also increase, as shown in  Table 2. Also, as 
shown in Table 2, as systemic risk increases with higher CLTVs (and with the 
growth in market share of these difficult-to-repay loans), the price of risk does 
not increase. In fact, the price of risk decreases, as shown by the decline in 
spreads. 







































Figure 4  House Price Appreciation Controlled for Volatility 
 
 
Source: Abraham et al. Wachter    227 
 
 
Table  1  Mortgage Originations by Product 
 




These  loans  are  extended  in  states  where  mortgages  were  previously  not 
affordable, thus expanding the market. Figures 5a, 5b, and 5c, respectively, 
show  where  housing  is  not  affordable  as  of  2000,  the  concentration  of 
subprime  teaser  rate  adjustable  rate  mortgages  (ARMs),  and  low 
documentation loans. When credit seized up in the spring of 2007, of course, 
it  is  these  markets  that  were  most  vulnerable  to  declines.  The  same 
phenomenon  of  poorly  underwritten,  initially  affordable,  but  then 
unaffordable loans, such as teaser rate loans whose required payments could 
double, occurred (although to a lesser extent) throughout the United States. 
However, it is in the high priced and difficult to develop, so-called sand states, 
that housing prices exploded with the wave of aggressive mortgage products 












































Table  2  Deterioration of Lending Standards 
 
 
Source: Loan Performance data as of November 2006. UBS, April 16, 2007, Thomas Zimmerman, “How Did We Get Here and What Lies Ahead” Wachter    229 
 
 
Figure 5a  2006 Census Tract –% Monthly Owner Costs with a Mortgage 
of 30 Percent or More 
 
Source: SocialExplorer.com, 2000 U.S. Census 
 
 
Figure 5b  2006 – Percentage of all Loans – Adjustable Rate 
arm _p 0%  to 25% >25%  to 50% >50%  to 75% >75%  to 100%  
Source: Bostic et al.  
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Figure 5c  2006 – Percent of all Loans – Low Documentation 
l ow doc_p 0%  to 25% >25%  to 50% >50%  to 75% >75%  to 100%  
Source: Bostic et al.  
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The problem of falling house prices, and mortgage defaults and foreclosures, 
is  not  confined  to  the  subprime  market.  In  fact,  financial  losses  due  to 
foreclosures  in  the  far  larger  prime  market  may  be  greater  in  total  dollar 
amount than those in the subprime market. The extension of credit increased 
the demand for all homes (and the overall indebtedness of the US households) 
and  the  subsequent  withdrawal  of  credit  reversed  this  demand.  These 
mortgages  were  originally  underwritten,  generally  using  reasonable  80% 
CLTVs,  but  they  are  now  also  underwater.  As  home  prices  fall  and 
unemployment  rises,  borrowers  default  on  these  loans  as  well.  It  was  not 
foreseen that there would be difficulty in repaying these loans because CLTVs 
were in fact, reasonable, albeit at inflated market prices. With subprime and 
NTM credit no longer extended, price collapses were inevitable, impacting the 
default rate for prime loans as well. 
 
Today’s crisis in the US emerges from a shift in the source and pricing of 
funding  for  mortgage  backed  securities.  While  securitization  has  played  a 
large role in the US, in the trading of MBS, investors have historically only 
been exposed to interest rate risk. Mortgage default risk was contained by 
underwriting, not priced and not borne by investors. With the growth of the 
private-label subprime market, this all changed.  
 
In the process, fees drove the demand for securitization at every stage of the 
newly  functionally  differentiated  production  of  mortgages.  Banks  received 
fees to originate-to-distribute, the secondary market received fees to bundle 
mortgages, and rating agencies received fees to rate the pools. At each stage, 
entities were able to book fees without exposure to long run-risks. Ultimately, 
investors  purchased  MBS.  However,  investors  could  also  hedge  their  risk. 
With  the  purchase  of  newly  available  credit  default  swaps  (CDS),  their 
positions could be insured against possible loss. There was counterparty risk 
to be considered, but if this was evaluated, investors might have concluded 
that these instruments had to be backed up or the entire system would fail. The 
providers of the CDS perhaps would have been viewed as (and certainly in 
this event, they were viewed as) “too big to fail”. 
  
Of  course,  fees  were  collected  for  the  rapidly  growing  provision  of  CDS       
as well. 
 
The “too big to fail” entities behind CDS and the lack of observable market 
trading of CDS, or private label MBS more generally, allowed the expansion 
of these products without exposing them to better informed market observers 
who might have evaluated the pricing of these instruments and shorted them 
at their current prices. To reiterate (as shown in Table 2), as systemic risk 
increases, the price of risk does not. 
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4  A New Paradigm: The Pro-cyclical Production of Risk  
 
Lenders who are attempting to gain market share and increase their fees may 
do so by underpricing their competitors and expanding the universe of risky 
loans and/or by accepting additional risk. As they compete for product market 
share and expand their supply of risky loans, the average risk premium on 
these loans would increase if the premium correctly reflected the additional 
risk of the pool. However, as Table 2 indicates and as Pavlov and Wachter 
(2006) explain, in the production of nonrecourse loans collateralized by real 
estate, this does not occur. Rather, due to incomplete markets, the price of risk 
decreases, as lenders compete for market share. The result is the underpricing 
of risk and the overpricing of assets (Pavlov and Wachter, 2008). 
 
Due to heterogeneity and illiquid  markets,  mortgage backed securities and 
related  derivatives  trade  infrequently,  thus  short  selling  these  overpriced 
assets is infeasible. Mortgage backed securities are marked to model, not to 
market, and could not be traded to drive prices to fundamental levels through 
short-selling pressure. 
 
The result of this underpriced risk and the lack of short selling is that asset 
price increases could persist and increase with further easing of credit. With 
artificially inflated asset prices, the balance sheets of financial institutions are Wachter    233 
 
 
also artificially inflated (Pavlov and Wachter, 2009a and 2009b).
5 Thus, the 
higher prices of real estate assets inaccurately reflect the risk of real estate 
loans on the balance sheets of banks. As Herring and Wachter (1999) shows, 
real estate booms and banking busts tend to go together. In fact, the current 
financial upheaval is only the most recent in a series of financial crises in 
which  property-based  asset  booms  are  accompanied  by  financial  system 
failure.  In  the  absence  of  arbitrage,  asset  bubbles  occur,  and  the  result  is 




Table  3  The Pro-cyclical Production of Risk as Lending Increases   
Lenders accept additional risk for increased initial fees and market share and 
rates decline 
• Efficient Outcome: Risk premia increase and asset prices decrease 
• Inefficient Outcome: Risk premia decrease and asset prices increase due 
to incomplete markets in real estate  
Coexistence of real estate booms and banking busts 
• Increased perceived bank capital  
• Evidenced by the recent crisis in which property based asset booms 
accompanied increases in financial and systemic risk 
• Others: S&L Crisis, Asian Financial Crisis, Japan’s Lost Decade 
Source: Pavlov and Wachter (2009b), Herring and Wachter 
 
 
Would  derivative  trading  in  these  markets  have  made  a  difference  and 
contained the asset bubble? In the US, derivative markets (the ABX) were 
introduced in 2006, which may have helped to contain the risk, although from 
the timing it is difficult to tell. It was not until March 2007 that the ABX 
signaled  mispricing,  and  even  at  that  point,  aggressively  priced  subprime 
lending  continued.  Derivative  trading  in  the  UK,  which  had  predicted  a 
collapse in property markets prior to 2007, did not stop credit expansion in an 




                                                            
5 Thus the cycle  mechanism operates through a financial system. Iacoviello (2005) 
links  the  constraint  and  nominal  debt  contract  features  of  mortgage  contracts  to  a 
wealth effect that dampens the business cycle. In contrast, Pavlov and Wachter (2009 a, 
2009b) identify this pro-cyclical impact through the overcoming of the constraint and 
increased value of the put option with nonrecourse debt. See also Kyotaki and Moore 
(1997) who develop a credit cycle model of non-recourse debt to show the dynamic 
interaction between credit limits and asset prices, and persistent fluctuations in output 
and asset prices. 234    Ongoing Financial Upheaval 
 
 
5  How Is This To Be Avoided? 
 
The lesson appears to be that as long as credit is being extended by entities 
with  a  short-run  view  to  maximizing  profits,  and  the  power  and  financial 
incentive to do so, even if mispriced for ultimate risks, they will do so. This 
clearly includes “too big to fail” entities which use demand deposit insured 
funds or other “protected” borrowing sources to garner short-term profits and 
market share (McCoy et al., 2008). The credit induced asset bubble covers up 
the deterioration in credit standards with the result of an extended period in 
which  the  bubble  continues  to  form  and  credit  risk  underpricing  becomes 
more severe.   
 
The symptom that identifies a credit induced asset bubble is the correlated 
easing of credit observed with non-fundamentally derived asset price inflation. 
Regulation and prudential supervision can limit bubbles in property markets 
that are the result of pro-cyclical deterioration in underwriting standards. In 
analyzing  the  Asian  Financial  Crisis,  we  present  evidence  that  countries 
experienced a more moderate property crash where underpricing of credit was 
kept under control by prudential supervision of the regulatory authorities (Koh 
et  al.  2004).  In  particular,  this  has  been  accomplished  by  the  Monetary 
Authority of Hong Kong, as we have shown.  
 
In  order  to  take  action  to  avoid  property  market  bubbles  induced  by  pro-
cyclical  erosion  in  credit  standards,  it  is  necessary  to  observe  that  this  is 
occurring. Without market indicators and understanding of this phenomenon, 
regulators will not be prompted to take appropriate prudential action. There is 
now an emerging consensus that balance sheets of banks and large non-bank 
entities must be kept well capitalized. Nevertheless, how is it to be known that 
capital, which includes value derived from property, is sufficient?  
 
In much cited work, Bernanke and Gertler (1999, 2002) discount the utility of 
inflation targeting to contain asset bubbles. However, Cecchetti et al. (2000) 
show the utility of containing asset bubbles, if they entail liquidity crises. It is 
an open question as to the instrument that should be used to contain a credit 
induced  asset  bubble.
6  The  mechanism  implemented  must  address  the 
question of the potential sufficiency of the underlying value of the collateral, 
since this is the direct risk induced by the artificially inflated asset prices. 
When  there  is  a  heightened  risk  that  an  underpriced  credit  induced  asset 
bubble  is  occurring,  consideration  should  be  given  to  instituting  “speed 
bumps”  that  would  require  higher  minimum  capital  reserves.  However,  in 
order  to  observe  the  correlation  of  these  risks,  we  first  need  to  observe, 
                                                            
6 The focus has been on the use of interest rates, although the literature suggests moves 
in contrary directions, see Cecchetti et al. (2000) and Faia and Monacelli (2007).  It is 
an open question which instrument should be used but the central bank’s ability to use 
interest rates as a tool to contain inflation should not be compromised.  Wachter    235 
 
 
measure, and track asset pricing, and also the pricing and terms of financing. 
To  quote  Chairman  Bernanke,  “The  events  of  the  past  year  or  two  have 
highlighted regulatory gaps and deficiencies that we must address… As we 
recover from the current crisis, it will be important to address these issues as 
soon as possible, to develop a regulatory structure that will better respond to 
future economic challenges” (Wall Street Journal, October 14, 2008). There is 
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